This paper addresses the measurement of income sorting and the attribution of observed sorting to different causes. In terms of measurement, I show that a standard decomposition of variance of household income into within jurisdiction and between jurisdiction components understates sorting in the presence of measurement error. Using 1990 US Census data, I find that adjusting for this error approximately doubles the estimated extent of sorting. On average, across all US metropolitan areas (MSAs) I find that approximately ten percent of the variation in household income can be explained by differences across jurisdictions. I attempt further to identify the extent to which the observed sorting may be attributed to a "Tiebout" mechanism, by which income sorting follows from sorting by preferences over governance into differently governed jurisdictions. I find that zip codes are considerably more homogeneous than jurisdictions, and that on average, neighboring zip codes in different jurisdictions are only slightly more different from each other than neighboring zip codes in the same jurisdiction.
Introduction
The causes, extent and consequences of the segregation of demographically heterogeneous populations into relatively homogeneous neighborhoods and jurisdictions are objects of considerable interest among economists and social scientists generally.
1 Segregation on the dimension of income ("income sorting"), at the jurisdictional level, is particularly interesting because, under some conditions, it is an equilibrium condition in the political economy models of jurisdiction choice that follow from Tiebout (1956) , as in Epple and Sieg (1999) .
Tiebout's notion that households choose jurisdictions based on the package of public goods they offer has also motivated studies of the valuation of public goods based on differences in property values across jurisdictions with different measured public goods quality.
This paper addresses the measurement of income sorting and the attribution of observed sorting to different causes. In terms of measurement, I show that a decomposition of variance into within jurisdiction and between jurisdiction components must be adjusted for the presence of measurement error in income. Using 1990 US Census data, I find that the adjustment approximately doubles the estimated extent of sorting. On average, across all US metropolitan areas (MSAs) I find approximately nine percent of the variation in household income can be explained by differences across jurisdictions. There is a great deal of heterogeneity in sorting: while sorting is statistically significant in almost all MSAs, the fraction of variation attributable to jurisidctions is very close to zero in a large number of MSAs, while the majority of variation can be explained by jurisdictions in others.
That jurisdictional differences do not yield perfect sorting is hardly surprising given the many dimensions of preferences that enter housing choice. Epple and Sieg (1999) observe that some very strong assumptions are required to obtain perfect sorting by income. Among the strongest are that preferences over public goods can be reduced to a single dimension, that the level of public goods provision is equal across locations within jurisdictions and that the housing stock within jurisdictions is determined by the preferences and budget constraints of households of present residents (so that we would only observe fixed housing quality in jurisdictions over time if relative amenity were also unchanging).
An empirical observation that there are significant differences in incomes across jurisdictions, combined with the fact that there are differences in public goods across jurisdictions cannot interpreted as proof that differences in government drive, or even enable income sorting. Jurisdictions are differentiated not only by government, but often by geographic amenity and housing quality. The well-established difficulties in estimating hedonic values for loca-1 see, for example, Wilson (1987) , Benabou (1993) , Kremer (1997) , Glaeser and Cutler (1997) .
tion and amenity are compounded by the fact that amenity characteristics such as school performance are likely to be determined in part by the characteristics of the households who use the amenity. Thus, if households sort by preferences over geography, and not at all on the basis of public goods, we will find high income households in the more geographically desirable locations, and also likely superior school performance and lower crime.
Recently, boundaries have come to prominence as a way around the identification problems caused by endogenous jurisdiction choice and formation. Black (1999) shows that controlling for all observables, virtually adjacent houses on opposite sides of school attendance lines within the same jurisdiction reflect quality differences in their associated schools in different prices. Relatedly, Hoxby (1994) uses the number of rivers in MSAs as a source of exogenous variation in the number of jurisdiction to estimate the effect of school choice on school quality. Both methodologies rely on the lack of amenity effects associated with being on one side or the other of these boundaries, independent of the associated difference in public goods.
I use a similar methodology to estimate the extent to which income sorting by jurisdiction is driven by differences in government, rather than locational characteristics. To do this, I
compare the extent of income sorting in two types of adjacent zip (postal) code pairs. The first type of adjacent zip code pairs is the set of zip codes which are next to each other, and are in the same jurisdiction (e.g. Cambridge, MA 02138 and Cambridge, MA 02139). The second type of adjacent zip code pairs is the set which are physically next to each other, but are separated by both a postal boundary and a jurisdiction boundary (e.g. Cambridge,
MA 02138 and Somerville, MA 02143). Zip code boundaries are drawn by the US postal service to rationalize delivery routes logistically. It is natural to think that these boundaries carry no more information concerning locational amenity than jurisdictional boundaries. If this condition is met, than the difference between the average extent of sorting between across-jurisdiction pairs and the average extent of sorting between within-jurisdiction pairs, corrected for sampling properties should be no smaller than the extent of sorting generated by a combination of geography and government (the average extent of sorting across neighboring jurisdiction pairs) minus the extent of sorting generated by purely geographic differences (the average extent of sorting among within jurisdiction pairs).
In 1990 Census data, I find that, on average, location on one or another side of a zip code boundary explains approximately 2.2 percent of the variance of household income.
Controlling for population characteristics of the zip code pair, the addition of a jurisdiction boundary increases the R 2 by an average of 0.4 percent. This leaves the large majority of locational income sorting unexplained by governmental differences.
The second section of this paper discusses methodological issues in the measurement of income sorting. The third section discusses the data I use to estimate income sorting at the jurisdiction and zip code level within MSAs, and the fourth section summarizes the extent of sorting I find. The fifth section presents the decomposition analysis, and the sixth section concludes.
Measuring Income Sorting
A natural way to measure sorting by any characteristic within subregions of a larger region (here, jurisdictions or zip codes within MSAs, "jurisdictions" hereafter when either can be meant), is to compare the average variance of the characteristic within jurisdictions to the variance at the regional (MSA) level. Kremer and Maskin (1996) note that such a variance decomposition has a neat interpretation as the R 2 in a regression of the characteristic on a full set of dummy variables indicating individual residence in each of the jurisdictions. Indexing households by h and jurisdictions by j, and labeling income y, we have:
whereȳ j is mean income in jurisdiction j, andȲ is mean income in the MSA. The numerator of the second term on the right hand side is the population weighted average of within jurisdiction variance. The denominator is the variance at the MSA level. If jurisdictions are close to homogenous, the fraction is small, and R 2 is large (with a maximum of one). If the expected squared difference between households' income within jurisdiction is equal to the squared difference between households at the regional level, then there is no sorting, and we have and R 2 of zero. Decomposing total variance, we can also interpret the R 2 measure as the ratio of the population weighted average squared deviations of jursidiction mean incomes from the population mean divided by total variance.
Assuming that variance is a meaningful measure of heterogeneity, the R 2 statistic can be applied to sample data, but only after two defects are addressed.
Adjustment for Sampling Without Replacement
A well known problem associated with the R 2 measure is that increasing the number of regressors increases the expectation of R 2 in finite samples, even if the added regressors are orthogonal to the dependent variable (here, income). That is, in a world with no behavioral income sorting, MSAs with more jurisdictions would have greater R 2 values mechanically.
To make the R 2 measure an estimate of behavioral sorting, we can observe that the expectation of variance within a jurisdiction, when households are randomly taken from a sample of the MSA without replacement, is given by:
Thus, if we replace H j with H j −1 in the numerator and H with H −1 in the denominator of equation (1), with random assignment of households to jurisdictions, we would obtain an expected R 2 of zero. With behavioral sorting, the expectation will be greater than zero.
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In the data I consider, populations are too large for this adjustment to make a significant difference. It should be observed, however, that the correction comes from the property that variance of sample means decrease in sample size. Other widely used measures such as the Index of Dissimilarity and Thiel's index suffer from the same bias towards observed sorting when jurisdiction sizes are small. Any finding of increasing segregation with increasing fragmentation should be presented and interpreted with care.
Measurement Error
It is well known that mean zero measurement error in the dependent variable, uncorrelated with either the right or left hand side variables in a regression will not bias estimated coefficients. However, such error will bias down estimated R 2 . Putting aside the small denominator adjustment, suppose that reported income is y h + v, where v is mean zero and i.i.d. across households with variance σ
As the signal to noise ratio Under the assumption that the covariance terms σ yjv and σ yv are zero at both the jurisdiction and MSA level (so that measurement error is no more severe in any jurisdictions than in others), we can subtract an estimate of σ 2 v from both expressions to obtain unbiased estimates of R 2 . That is, a measurement error adjusted R 2 is equal to
Measurement error v can come from several sources in cross sectional survey data. First, we are typically interested in a measure of sorting by wealth rather than income, but annual, rather than lifetime, income is reported in most survey data. This would not be a problem if annual income were simply equal to a constant fraction of lifetime income. However, this relationship is violated both by year-specific shocks to income and by a generally upward trending age-earnings profile. A young graduate student may exert at least as great a positive externality on neighbors as an old tenured professor, but will show up in cross sectional data as low income. Second, households may misreport their earned income in the survey year.
Third, and particularly important in the census data, income is reported in bins, so that we must guess an income for each household with income reported in that range.
To estimate σ 2 y and σ 2 v separately, we recall the formula for attenuation bias in a regression where a single right hand side variable is measured with error. If we regress some variable Z on reported income y, which is a noisy measure of true income y * :
then we have
By contrast, if we find an instrument that is correlated with y * , but not with v or , then the two stage least squares estimatorb IV has the true coefficient on income as a probability limit:
Comparing the OLS and IV estimators yields the relationship
Since we observe the combined signal and noise variance of observed income σ 2 y + σ 2 v , if we can find an auxilliary regression of the form described above, then we can estimate measurement error and the unbiased sorting estimator R 2 me .
Data
I estimate the extent of income sorting using 1990 US census (STF3A) data on the distribu- To estimate measurement error in income, I use 1990 Census microdata (not available with jurisdictional or zip code detail) on household incomes, education and house price.
The microdata reports a bounded, continuous (integer) value for income, which I transform into the midpoint of the corresponding bin that would be reported in the geography-specific STF3A data (so that a household reporting income of $12,300 is assigned the $12,500 midpoint of the $10,000 to $15,000 bin). I regress the reported value of housing (among homeowners) on the transformed income variable to obtain the OLS estimate. The IV estimate is obtained by instrumenting for the transformed income variable with the mean income for the industry and MSA cell in which the household head works (so that all households in Pittsburgh headed by a real estate broker receive the same aggregated instrument). I perform these regressions in both logs and levels, at the MSA level. The assumption is that the industry mean affects housing purchases only through household income, and not through any unobserved variables included in the error term in equation (4). Use of education as an alternative instrument can corroborate this assumption.
Results
With no correction for measurement error, across 207 US MSAs, at the jurisdiction level I find a mean R 2 for the level of income of 0.04. At the zip code level, I find a significantly larger value of 0.07. As reported in Table 1 Correcting the sorting measures accordingly, I find a mean R 2 of 0.09 in levels and 0.11 in log income at the jurisdiction level, and 0.14 in levels and 0.17 in logs at the zip code level.
The corrected R 2 estimates provide unbiased estimates of the extent of sorting by income into zip codes and jurisdictions. Two notable facts are, first, that while the extent of sorting is statistically significant in almost every MSA, the large majority of income differences across households survive to the level of jurisdiction and the finer level of zip code. Second, a significant fraction of the variation in income not explained by differences across jurisdictions 3 We might think that ratios of income are more relevant to choice than levels 4 One could imagine more involved political models which result in heterogeneous services within jurisdictions such that households are satisfied, but this is outside of models such as Epple and Sieg (1999) is explained by differences across zip codes within jurisdictions. This implies that there are important differences in conditions within jurisdictions, so that government is imperfectly correlated with other local amenities.
Notably, matching the result of Epple and Sieg (1999) In addition to measurement error, "perfect" income sorting is hindered by the fact that the large share of population located in some jurisdictions implies that there must be some mixing of income. For example, a metropolitan area with just two jurisdictions cannot feature an R 2 value of one as long as there are more than two income categories which positive population. Large cities such as New York City are typically larger than the population in any single income category, and hence must feature some income mixing. Table 1 . The second value is income sorting which would occur if "perfect" sorting were accomplished by locating the wealthiest households in the smallest jurisdictions and the poorest households in the largest jurisdictions. If sorting were complete, the observed data (circles) would lie along the 45-degree line with the maximized R 2 values.
As noted above, in most MSAs, this observed value is substantially less than one, with a mean value of 0.76. Evidently, observed sorting, with a mean of 0.09 on average falls far short of this value, so the lack of income sorting can be attributed only in small part to feasibility constraints. Further, the correlation between perfect sorting and actual sorting is highly imperfect, with a value of 0.40. Again, it would be interesting in future research to understand the basis for difference across metropolitan areas in the extent of sorting. Part of such an understanding will include distinguishing government-based sorting from sorting based on other determinants of jurisdiction choice.
Decomposing Income Sorting
As a start at understanding what drives income sorting, it would be interesting to disentangle governance and public goods from other locational attributes as causes of sorting. The fact that zip codes are more homogeneous than jurisdictions implies that there are neighborhood effects. This suggests that some fraction of the observed jurisdictional sorting, too, is driven by extra-governmental characteristics of jurisdictions, since jurisdictions, like zip codes, are locationally homogeneous relative to the larger metropolitan area. In theory, all of the observed sorting into jurisdictions could be driven by locational factors other than governance. However, the results are at least theoretically consistent with a world in which households have lexicographic preferences, such that they choose first a governmental package (and hence a jurisdiction), and next choose the neighborhood they like best within the jurisdiction. In this case, all of the sorting at the jurisdiction level would be attributable to differences in governance.
Putting any structure on the basis of jurisdiction choice is a risky enterprise. As Epple and Sieg (1999) illustrate, it is not trivial to prove that households will sort into jurisdictions by income on the basis of governance, even under extremely strong assumptions. I thus do not attempt to recover underlying preference paramaters. Rather, I simply ask: how much of the income sorting we observe at the jurisdictional level can be attributed to the fact that there are governmental differences between jurisdictions?
To answer this question, I estimate a sorting measure for "regions" defined as physically adjacent pairs of zip codes. The large majority of zip codes are located almost entirely within a single jurisdiction, and I confine the analysis to such zip codes. This way, the border between two zip codes can either be a mere postal division, or can be both a postal division as well as a jurisdictional division. Under an assumption on the nature of zip code and jurisdictional boundaries, the difference between the measure of sorting observed between acrossjurisdiction zip code pairs and the measure of sorting observed between within-jurisdiction pairs, on average, can be interpreted as the sorting "value added" of governmental differences.
The critical assumption is that within jurisdiction zip code boundaries signify the same degree of extra-governmental neighborhood differences, such as differentiated topography or housing characteristics, as jurisdictional boundaries. I consider this to be a weaker condition than two other boundary-related identifying assumptions that have come to prominence in the literature on local public goods. Black (1999) assumes that if differences in prices of houses that are virtually adjacent, but are located across school attendance lines within the same jurisdiction, are orthogonal to observable characteristics and correlated with differences in school quality across the attendance lines, then the differences are caused by the differences in school quality. This implicitly relies on the assumption that school attendance lines convey zero unobservable information about non-school neighborhood characteristics. This is stronger than my assumption, because I require only that, the magnitude of neighborhood differences across zip code lines are on average equal to the magnitude of neighborhood differences across jurisdiction lines. I do not require an absence of neighborhood differences as Black does. Hoxby (1994) argues that the number of rivers in a metropolitan area causes jurisdic-tional fragmentation, but does not cause economic segregation. This assumption allows an interpretation of a relationship between the number of school districts and school quality to be interpreted as causal. If variation in school quantity were generated by a mechanism which generated correlated economic segregation, then we could not reject the alternative interpretation that the differences in average school quality is driven by economic segregation.
For such an interpretation to be ruled out, it must be the case that rivers do not generate economic segregation. In turn, this requires that rivers do not mark changes in neighborhood characteristics. Again, I regard this as a stronger assumption than the assumption that With measurement error corrections, I find a mean R 2 of 0.0217 in the level of income, and 0.0455 in log income. Without covariates, I find that the mean R 2 values are indistinguishable whether the zip code boundary is a within jurisdiction boundary, or also a jurisdictional boundary. Adding demographic covariates, however, I find a small positive effect on R 2 of jurisdictional difference. Table 2 shows that "adding" a jurisdictional boundary increases the extent of sorting by approximately 0.004 in levels and approximately 0.008 in logs. Evidently, different governments explain only a small fraction of locational sorting on income.
Conclusions
Jurisdictions are segregated by income relative to metropolitan areas. Correcting for measurement error in income approximately doubles estimates of the extent of sorting, but sorting remains far from complete. Observed sorting at the jurisdiction level may be gen- total population of the combined zip codes, and population share of the larger zip code. ** Significant at 5 %. erated by differences in tax and spending policies, or by differences in extra-governmental amenity, or, most likely, by a combination of the two. The evidence presented here suggests that extra-governmental amenity plays a very large role in the sorting process, and that these amentities vary not only across jurisdictions, but also within.
The conclusion that neighborhood effects are an important source of sorting within jurisdictions is supported by the fact that zip codes are considerably more homogeneous than jurisdictions. Further support comes from the fact that neighboring zip codes are only slightly more sorted by income if they are in different jurisdictions than if they are in the same jurisdiction. The existence of significant income differences across zip codes suggests that there are likely to be differences associated with other boundaries, such as rivers and school attendance lines which have previously been assumed to be innocuous with respect to neighborhood effects. The evidence suggests further that there are likely to be interactions between neighborhood characteristics and government. Different zip codes in the same jurisdiction likely enjoy different level of public goods quality (by virtue of different spending on different schools, or different access to public facilities. The fact that different governments explain only a small fraction of income sorting implies only that government is not the sole factor driving sorting. It does not imply that quality of access to public goods is relatively unimportant.
